REFORM OF UNIVERSITY COUNCIL

 REFORM OF UNIVERSITY COUNCIL: FROM PREFECTORY TO POLICY GOVERNANCE – A case for Curtin University of Technology

 

A O de Sousa

Curtin University of Technology

 

 

 

Abstract

 

This paper reviews how the business of a University Council (hereafter referred to as the “Board”) of a major Australian University has been transformed since the 1970s.  The paper argues the need for a continuing reform of the Board if it is to join a class of organisations committed to excellence in governance.

 

The paper draws primarily on the Carver Policy Governance modelâ and poses some questions for the refinement of the model in the post September eleven environment which has seen some spectacular corporate collapses and again raised the issue of the nature of board governance.  It argues that universities, outside the German corporate governance model, offer the best opportunity for shared governance through the age-old non-management body referred to in this paper as the Academic Senate. Finally, the reforms of the board at Curtin University of Technology are conceptualised and proposals made for further refinement of the reform process.

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

The operation of governing boards of universities has come under scrutiny from governments from time to time in Australia, Canada and Britain (CUC, 2000).  In the USA, the debate in the late fifties and sixties, centred on the concern of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) about the gross interference in academic and pedagogy matters which could affect intellectual scholarship (Jencks & Reissman, 1968).  The outcome was a charter to assist governing boards and faculty alike on drawing the distinction between academic freedom and financial responsibility.  This made considerable sense in the American environment because of the separate distinctive constitutions of those responsible for governance (Boards of Regents, Governors or Trustees) from those who direct the management in the nature and conduct of academic programs.  In the British and European models – from which the Australian models derive – the composition of governing bodies included not only the external stakeholders but also those more intimately connected with the institution – the workers (staff), the alumni (the recent staff and students) and the students themselves.  Here concerns about boards related to effectiveness, their size and balance, and the nature of the governance – that is whether the syndics, were representatives of the constituents or whether they were trustees for all stakeholders.  In the broadest sense, both the European and the USA concerns relate to how universities can become more effective in managing the business without compromising the primary purpose for which universities exist.  In Australia governance issues have emerged in the government agenda through a series of green and white papers (Dawkins, 1998; West, 1998; DEST, 2002) and a series of government-commissioned papers on the review of the management of higher education (CTEC, 1986; Hoare, 1995).

 

In a generic sense governing boards have been known to exist in one form or another through the centuries eg Dutch East Indian Company, (British) East Indian Company.  Yet, it was not until the late 20^th Century that focus has been attached to what these boards actually do.  One of the most thorough explanations of what all boards do is provided in Boards That Make a Difference (Carver, 1997).  This led Carver to coin the term Policy Governanceâ which describes a set of conceptually complete and internally consistent principles that address the job of any governing board.  It then proposes the rules or policies required for effective, accountable governance without being involved in the micro-management of the organisation.  Crucial to this model is the relationship with the Chief Executive Officer (referred to as the CEO) and through the CEO, the management of the organisation.

 

The board is the owner of the organisation.  Its responsibility is to ensure that the organisation it owns “works”.  Enabling this to happen is all that there is for a board, and the focus of its functions must constantly be attuned to this central objective.  Carver does this through a policy structure for governance that is ultimately accountable to its owners.  The model enables the board to govern as opposed to manage; it enables the board to assess the performance of the CEO and management and it enables the board to know if it is on track in achieving its goals.  All other activities of traditional boards, which are seen to be important, are strictly speaking, not a function of boards.

 

GENERAL TRENDS IN EVOLUTION OF BOARDS IN UNIVERSITIES

 

Historical Approach to Board Governance in Universities

 

In the earliest universities of Europe, governing boards are much younger than the traditional Rector-Academic Senate bodies.  Universities were founded as eleemosynary endowed corporations. Benefactors or patrons often had a say on how their monies were spent.  However, this was done in less formal settings, through individual colleges.  Whenever a dispute arose, the Visitor was requisitioned to inquire into alleged irregularities (Khan & Davison, 1995).  None-the-less, the collection of a group of scholars, (variously known as the Professoriate, Academic Boards or Councils, Faculty Senates, the Couryt, the Regents House) hereafter referred to as Academic Senates, provided the governance and management of the University.

 

The modern board was established in the older universities as they came to rely on government sources of funding.  Royal Charters, establishing the oldest British universities and the oldest university in Australia, have been replaced by a system of acts of parliament.  These acts establish the authority for boards and provide for the functions of the universities.  Consequently, the concept of collegium and syndics is built in the constitution of many of the boards whereby staff and students, as well as the major political parties, and persons in public office are represented on such boards.  The concept of having internal stakeholders on the board came precisely because these boards took over the running of the universities from the previous academic senates.  This is a major difference with corporate boards where shareholders own the company and are represented on the board and apart from the CEO (who is a shareholder) members are usually external to management.  Also in some universities, e.g. at Cambridge and Oxford, the legal constituted governing body does not have overriding powers over the older academic senates.  There is no known equivalent in the corporate world, except perhaps to some extent in the German and Dutch models.  Corporate influence on the higher education sector through governments has been a feature in the literature of higher education governance since the late 1980s.  In Australia, discussions have centred on the need for Boards to act as Trustees, rather than representatives or delegates of their constituents and the need to reduce the size of boards (in 1987 the average was 35, in 2002 it is around 21) – still too large compared with public corporations.

 

Stages in Board Governance Models

 

In the paper, University Governance: An Australian Experience (de Sousa, 1997) the author provided a general overview of four different stages of governance development by boards.  These are summarised and brought within the context of the present paper.

 

In a greenfields university, the CEO (whose idea it might have been to set up the University (founder-CEO)) could be highly dependent on the managerial and lobbying skills of its board.  The board is thus a governing-management board.  This has been called the kitchen-table board (Carver & Carver, 2001) and has been previously described as a prefectorymodel of governance. (Parhizgar, 1994). 

 As the organisation becomes more established and with the appointment of more senior managers, board members are released from their consultant-management roles.  Boards then become more dependent on the CEO reports and on his/her advice, which in turn is being informed by the senior managers.  At this point, the board usually delegates day-to-day management to the CEO, without losing control over reports on the management aspects of the organisation.  This second stage may be referred to as the “Management-Report” model of governance.

 

A third stage is reached usually as the management reports become more complex and detailed.  Managements generally are unclear about the extent to which they are empowered (despite delegation) to make decisions, because of the continued need to discuss management reports at board level.  In order to cope with complex reports, boards usually establish a sub-committee structure.  These so-called expert committees comprise a mix of board members and internal management members who initially make recommendations to the board.  The governing board then eventually becomes a rubber-stamping body upon receiving committee advice. The expert committees may eventually be given decision-making powers – delegated from the board – and in turn these delegations in practice cascade at the local level.  The governance style therefore changes from a prefectory model to a supervisory model (Parhizgar, op cit).  In extreme examples of rubber-stamping, Parhizgar would describe the board as becoming Perfunctory.  Because the model is highly dependent on a well-articulated and layered committee structure it becomes a committee-driven system as opposed to an executive-driven system (de Sousa, op cit).  There may be a number of advantages in a committee-driven decision making system; however its principal disadvantages are that it disempowers the CEO and the management in unintended ways; makes for long and arduous decision making processes; and decreases executive accountability. 

 

A review of the committee-driven system inevitably leads to consideration of the role of the board itself – which is the peak “committee” of the organisation.  The reform process reins back the committee system, gives more responsibility to senior managers and therefore clarifies the authority and role of the CEO and his/her management team.  In this fourth stage of governance review the balance between committee/executive models is often matched by an articulated statement on the role of the Board itself.  In Australia, since the Review of the Management of Higher Education (Hoare, op cit), boards have focussed on the following six issues

 

·               Strategic directions

·               Compliance, (with legal and internal policies) and risk management

·               Fiscal responsibility

·               Fiduciary and ethical behaviour

·               Quality assurance

·               Appointment, review of performance and remuneration of the CEO.

 

A comprehensive internally consistent policy framework which distinguishes between policies set up for governance – and approved by the Board – and a set of policies for operational purposes approved by the CEO or the academic senate, completes the suite of measures to complete the reform of the Board at this fourth stage.  The governance style then changes from a supervisory model to a superintendence model (Parhizgar, op cit).

 

The interest in the fourth stage reforms of boards emerges from an integrative approach of governance and policy making (de Sousa, 1998).  In this approach there is an examination of whether there are meaningful distinctions between types of policy and decision-making which might be helpful in defining roles of governing bodies, management (whether CEO, or management committees) and administrative (operational) staff.  One of the earliest and most comprehensive typologies on policy development (Lockwood & Davies, 1985) identified three categories of policy:

 

·               Strategic Policies: policies concerned with the role and mission of the institution

·               Substantive Policies: which give effect to strategic policies and which form the basis of most political interaction with groups; and

·               Climatic Policies: designed to create a favourable psychological and social setting through which interest groups are activated to play a constructive part in strategic and substantive policy.

 

It is contended that whilst the above typology is useful in describing different kinds of policy, less useful is guidance on how they could be related to different levels of governance and management.  A different typology (Tilley, 1998) for the University context assisted in the distinction of the roles of boards, management and academic senate.

 

·               Boards are responsible for corporate and strategic policies – policies concerned with the mission, external accountability, institutional strategy, including the development of the major (key) plans for the University, and oversight of the development of operational policies.

·               CEOs (Management) are responsible for organisational policies – concerned with the implementation and support of the corporate and strategic policies, including operational policies on human, financial resource management and student administration.

·               Academic Senates are responsible for academic policies – concerned with academic standards, performance, quality and academic freedom.

 

Discussion in Australia for better management of boards has not taken the debate of reform significantly further since 1995 when the Hoare committee reported.  The green paper, Meeting the Challenges: The Governance and Management of Universities (DEST, 2002) reviews case studies of governance and proposes that universities learn from each other and institute best practices.  The focus has been on better preparation of board members, and on covering the significant functions of the university at the strategic and corporate level whilst leaving day-to-day management to the CEO, which is monitored and overviewed.

 

Since the late 1990s, universities have adopted a range of measures, which have redirected their efforts in planning, market intelligence, entrepreneurship and innovation.  Generally, cultures are changing within academia as there is an increased amount of casualisation of staff and quality assurance practices are embedded in every set of operations.  In this environment there is opportunity for further reflection on how excellence may be pursued.  However, strategic planningas opposed to strategic visioning, and the role of boards in the latter rather than in the former, in the context of the boards’ role of assessing whether its own expectations are being met, has yet to emerge in any considered way.

 

The coupling of policy reform and the restoration of executive control over management (described by some critics as managerialism) in the fourth stage offers a reflection on how governing boards regain a sense of accountability.  It naturally leads to the fifth stage where policy and governance are furthered aligned.  The fifth stage referred to as the Policy Governance stage is therefore a quest for excellence at board level.  It ensures that the board is totally accountable for the organisation it owns and governs.  The delegation principles of policy governance enhance the accountability of staff to the board and allow the board to control staff actions and decisions without interfering in their work or reducing their rights or privileges.  It does this by ensuring that board policies are truly board policies that are designed to give instructions about performance expectations, assign those instructions lucidly, and then reappraise whether the expectations it set are met.

 

Since its introduction in 1997, John Carver’s Policy Governanceâ model has been acclaimed “as the world’s only complete, universal theory of governance – a conceptually coherent set of principles and concepts (not of structure).  The model enables boards – as “servant-leaders” of shareholders, public, members (or other “ownership” equivalent) – to ensure that organisations achieve board – stated goals and conduct themselves with probity” (Policy Governance Definedin www.carvergovernance.com).  Over 160 books and published articles and monographs describe various aspects and applications of the model.  The Carver Governance Design Inc is committed to professional education of board members, development of the model, training of consultants and the promotion of the model.  In 2001 a separate International Policy Governance Association (IPGA) was incorporated as a non-profit organisation formed in 1999 for boards that govern with excellence. IPGA’s charter is to

 

·               create clear measurable definitions of what organisations are for and how they will behave;

·               provide and monitor those definitions in a manner that empowers staff to use all their talent to deliver desired results; and

·               root everything they are and do in their accountability to the people on whose behalf they govern.  

(IPGA website policygovernanceassociation.org)

 

Since 2001 members have included some of the biggest boards in USA, Canada, Europe and Japan. Although applicable to all types of boards, its use in non-profit  organisations appears to be popular.

 

What then is this model? Is it as good as it is claimed to be? How can it be used in a University setting?  What is the place of academic senates within this governance model?  How can it be used within Curtin University of Technology?  These are some of the questions discussed in the remaining sections of this paper. 

 

THE CARVER POLICY GOVERNANCE MODEL

 

In order to engage in Policy governance, one needs a clear understanding of terms used.  Governance is the act of ruling through the making of orders or rules.  It is the supreme act of authority and accountability.  Monarchical, Papal or Parliamentary authority typically describes governance activities.  It must not be confused with Management which is the act of executing the orders or rules through processes and procedures.  

 

The term policy usually refers to a course or general plan of action.  It is the term used to mandate decisions given with authority.  Therefore it is instrumental to the process of governance.  For monarchs, popes and parliaments this is signified by decrees, bulls, acts, by-laws, etc.  That policy should be tied to governance is a perfectly natural act for any board.  Procedures on the other hand explain how the policies are put in place.  This therefore appears to be the proper job of management.  Researchers in policy development have concluded that whilst it is easy to define and distinguish the terms “policy” and “procedure”, separating them in manuals has been difficult and sometimes an exercise in futility.  What constitutes a policy at one level or to one person, may be interpreted as a procedure to another and vice-versa.  Therefore Policy and Procedures Manuals are often presented as cohesive documents.

 

Similarly too, whilst it may be easy to define “governance” and distinguish it from “management” in practice researchers in governance have found it hard to say where the line distinguishes between the two.  What may be governance for one person, may be management to another and vice-versa.  

 

A prominent group of governance experts have concluded that “effective governance by a board of trustees is a relatively unnatural act…trustees are little more than high-powered, well intentioned people engaged in low-level activities” (Chiat, Holland & Taylor, 1996 p.1).  Back in the 70s it was recognised that they (boards) do not function (Drucker, 1974) and ninety-five percent were not fully doing what they were legally, morally and ethically supposed to do (Geneen, 1984). All too often trustees’ response to the dilemma of governance is exemplified by either of two extreme attitudes – abdication or intrusion (Zwingle, 1970). Boards, in fact, turn out to be incompetent groups of competent individuals (Carver & Carver, 2001).  Attempts to distinguish between governance and management are found in a number of published works (Gallagher, 2001; Meredith, 2002).

 

Boards by-and-large tended to be groups who

“lent prestige to organisations, to rubber stamp management desires, give board members an opportunity to be unappointed department heads, to be sure staff get the funds they want, micromanage organisations, to protect lower staff from management, sometimes give advantage to board members as special customers (a highly questionable practice) or give board members something to put on their resumes” (Carver & Carver, op cit). 

 In fact it is sometimes a mates club where the governance – management roles are fused and where the kitchen-table enterprise approach described in the formation of a greenfields organisation is never weaned out.

 

Carver’s study of a variety of boards (government, corporate, profit, non-profit, voluntary) established that there is only one reason to have a board.  In simple terms a board exists (usually on someone else’s behalf) to be accountable that its organisation works.  The board is where all authority resides, until some is given away (delegated) to others.  This simple “total authority – total accountability” principle (within the laws of the country) is true of all boards. The Carver Policy Governance modelâ assists the board in coming up with its own understanding of where governance stops and management begins.  By establishing each board’s own interpretation of governance verses management, the model helps to resolve the quandary for board members and staff alike.

 

The Policy Governanceâ approach introduces objectivity and removes fickle approaches by individuals, avoids tendency for grandstanding (outsmarting) others at board meetings and capricious decision-making.  Carver’s research indicates that a number of board members who have been troubled by their role in rubberstamping or micro managing management decisions, found Policy Governance offering them a refreshing new discipline.  Policy Governance therefore requires an understanding of the principles and processes related to

 

·               the concept of owner-representatives

·               the need for systematic delegation

·               the use of ends-means policies

·               crafting policies as nested sets

·               board discipline, mechanics and structure

·               monitoring and evaluation;

·               board meetings

 

Board as Owner-Representatives

 

In Australia the case has been established that Boards are trustees for their organisations (Bennetts v The Board of Fire Commissioners of NSW, 1968) even when persons are appointed to it as delegates or representatives of their constituents.  This concept does not go far enough as the concept of ownership.  An owner is one who possesses something as his or her property.  In the business sector, the board of directors is the voice of the owners (shareholders) of the corporation. Similarly too, every board, whether for profit or non-profit, community based agency, professional, trade or ethnic association, is established as the voice of the respective owners.

 

In government or community agencies, board membership may comprise persons from the various professions (ostensibly because diverse skills background is important for board performance) and also of representative groups, eg staff or consumer advocates.  Nonetheless as a board, and in the matter of governance, it is important that they see themselves as “owners” of the enterprise.  Policy Governance demands the discipline that the board is the on-site voice of the owners and the board speaks in the interests of the owners.  Therefore for this purpose it must be understood that representatives of staff, customers or consumers on the board must represent the owners, rather than their own constituents.  That does not mean staff, customers, or for that matter suppliers, are not important, but those roles per se do not qualify them as owners.  This cardinal point of distinction has been the subject of constant turbulence within boards.  Within higher education institutions questions of conflict of interest have bedevilled board members from staff and student constituencies, in the corporate sector shareholder representatives with supplier interests have occasionally caused board turmoil (BRW, 2002).

 

The Boards’ Need for Systematic Delegation

 

If the board is the owner, then it has total authority over the enterprise and total accountability for the organisation.  But the board is almost always dependent on others to carry out its work, that is, to exercise most of the authority and to fulfil most of the accountability.  In the Associations Incorporation Acts of Australian States, the board members of many voluntary organisations may hold the honorary positions of Secretary, Treasurer, sports secretary, social secretary etc.  These persons may in fact do the work on behalf of the board, but their individual role as voluntary delegated management persons is technically different from that of the board.  The board’s dependence on others to do its job requires the board to give careful thought to principles of sound delegation.

 

Since it is in the board’s interest to see that the organisation works, and since the running of the organisation is in the hands of management, it is in the interests of the board to see that management is successful.  Therefore, the board must ensure that its actions will lead to a successful management; it must be able to recognise whether or not it is successful.  This need for recognition calls for the board to be clear about its expectations because, without setting expectations, there is no way of determining success.

 

A board may assign expectations on a number of people; however Carver (2001) recommends that the board use a single point of delegation and hold this position accountable for meeting all the boards expectations for organisational performance.  That single point of delegation should be the CEO.  The concept of a single point of delegation sits comfortably with the trend of boards to focus on the job of hiring, remunerating and assessing the performance of the CEO as one of five or six strategic tasks of the board.  In effect the board has one employee.

 

Confusion over delegation has muddied the functioning of boards, particularly in non-profit or non-business sector corporations. There are a number of reasons or ways in which this confusion arises:

 

a)              in founding parent organisations, the board may post-date the establishment of the organisation.  Very often the founding parent becomes the CEO, and the board does not make the transition from the kitchen-table board to clearly establish its proper relationships with its employee, the founding CEO, and its own role as owner with a total sense of accountability;

b)             the benevolent culture of non profit agencies has not helped in clearly establishing the board-staff relationship.  The board must be totally accountable for the organisation and have, therefore, total authority over it – including the CEO.  If this principle is recognised, then the board is accountable for defining what is the CEO’s job and that the CEO does it well.  It cannot be said that the CEO is accountable for what is the board’s job and that the board do its job well.  Carver (2001) cites evidence where CEOs are expected to tell boards what to talk about (provide agendas).  “Nowhere else in the organisation is there a situation where subordinates are responsible for the conduct of supervisors.  This board-staff inversion leads to a CEO-centrism where the board’s performance becomes the executive responsibility” (Herman & Heimovics, 1991, p.xiii) which is an untenable principle of board governance.

 

c)              the method or process of management-created proposals moving forward to board meetings with requests for approval has not helped clarify the delegation principle.  The reason for this is because the documents presented to boards often outline far too much detail, for it to be regarded as a delegation instruction.  Carver states

 

“When the board has approved a staff recommendation, doesn’t the resulting approved document become a clear board instruction?  Actually, it does not.  For example, when a board approves the CEO’s personnel policies or the budget document, does it really mean as an instruction every tiny segment of that document?  Does every budget line and the smallest issues of a program plan become a criterion on which the CEO is judged?  Certainly not.  Even the most micromanaging board does not go that far.  The traditional habits of board approvals are not proper governance, but commonplace examples of boards not doing their jobs.” (Carver, 2001 p.5)

 

d)             lastly, delegation to a CEO is compromised by delegating the same responsibilities to other sub-CEO staff, or through the creation of sub-committees that have delegated power.  The latter leads to management by committees, and a dilution of executive responsibility.

 

For a board to be totally accountable, (as it must be as an owner of the organisation) it has to be able to craft instructions (or to govern).  These are called board expectations, and they require the board to

 

a)              be definite about its performance expectations,

b)             assign these expectations clearly; and

c)              check that those expectations are being met.

 

Therefore clear delegations will set clear expectations, and clear expectations alone can assist in the evaluation of whether the expectations are being met.

 

The Use and Crafting of Ends-Means Policies

 

If a board’s job is to see that an organization works it must define “works”.  Works in this context can only be determined by measuring success. Yet boards can control too much and micro-manage, or too little by trusting too much and rubberstamping.  A board needs to find the right balance in controlling for success in a way that empowers staff to be creative and innovative, but equally ensuring that it is not abdicating its authority and losing accountability.  According to Carver (2001) Policy Governance provides the key to resolving the quandary for boards in knowing what to control and how to control it.  The model therefore calls for an understanding of organisational purposes.  The definition of purpose consists of three decisions

            

a)              what results for which?

b)             what recipients at what?

c)              what worth?

 

It is very much about the organisation’s impact on the outside world that justifies its existence (very much like cost-benefit).  In Policy Governance, the outcome of decisions is called ends.  Ends decisions (or destination decisions) are always decisions for persons outside the organisation, along with cost or priority.  Ends never describe the activities of the organisation.

 

A decision that is not an ends decision is a means decision.  Means decisions (eg reading program, staff credentials, classroom arrangement) are extremely important because they determine the success of an organisation.  However, no organisation was ever formed so that it could be governed well, have good human resources policies, a fine budget, sound procedures, or well thought out plans – except perhaps in the Yes, Minister bureaucracy (BBC Series, 1987).  Carver claims that the ends/means distinction is peculiar to Policy Governance principles.  In Policy Governance, means are means simply because they are not ends.  Carver (op cit) claims that many boards routinely confuse the ends-means distinction by drawing on analogies such as policy/procedure, plan/strategy, policy/administration or goals/objectives.  Ends statements are not necessarily identical to mission statements, because in many cases mission statements are not written up with ends outcomes.

 

For a board to have control, it must have control over ends and means.  It does this in three different ways:

 

a)              the board makes ends decisions in a proactive, positive, prescriptive way.  These decisions are called Ends Policies.  It makes ends decisions after it has input from owners (including board members), staff and experts (consultants)

b)             the board makes means decisions about its own job (that is, about governance, visioning or other skills in governance) in a positive, proactive, prescriptive way.  These decisions are referred to as Governance Process policies when confined to the board’s own job and Board-Staff Linkage policies when confined to the relationship between governance and management; and

c)              the board makes decisions about the staff’s means in a proactive, and boundary setting way.  These prescribe what can jeopardise the prudent and ethical conduct of the organisation in going about its business.  These decisions are referred to as Executive Limitations policies (Other terms are Management Exceptions policies or Executive Constraints).

 

The above three categories of board policies are all that is required for governance by a board.

 

The negative language used in Executive Limitations policies is quite deliberate.  If a board establishes the Ends policies surely it must concern itself only with the ends, by monitoring and measuring the ends?  There is no need to impose restrictions on staff through the means of executive limitations?  This assumption, whilst largely correct, fails to acknowledge that governing boards are also accountable for means.  Some staff means could get the organisation the ends it sets, in unacceptable or unethical ways.  It is for this reason that the board must set the Management Exceptions policies.  However, care must be taken that these exceptions are precise, few and absolutely necessary, otherwise one could stifle staff initiative and innovativeness – precisely the skills for which they are hired.  Therefore it is a board’s job to determine the means it does not want the staff to engage in, and spell this out clearly.  If this is done, the board can tell the CEO that as long as the ends are met and the unacceptable means do not occur, the CEO can make all the decisions in the organisation that are deemed wise and necessary.  By doing so, the board gives the maximum power possible to its CEO.

 

This Policy Governance approach has therefore a number of advantages

 

a)              it recognises that board interference in operational matters makes ends harder and more expensive to meet;

b)             it accords the CEO maximum authority as the board can responsibly give;

c)              it provides room for managerial flexibility, creativity and timelines; it provides the ability to make quick decisions in a competitive environment;

d)             it dispels the notion that the board knows better than the staff what means to use.  Therefore there is no need for the board to supervise professionals;

e)              it makes it clear, in advance, what means are not approved, thereby relieving the board from having to approve staff plans, policies or repetitive policies;

f)              it makes it clear to board members, what they need to focus on, thereby avoiding the capricious nature of decision making; and

g)             lastly, and most importantly, by staying out of means (except of the executive limitations), the board retains the ability to hold the CEO accountable for the decisions that take place in the system.

 

Thus the board knows that its organisation works when

 

i)          it accomplishes the intended results for the intended people at the intended cost or priority – expressed in the ends policies; and

ii)        it avoids unacceptable methods, conduct, activities in achieving the ends – as expressed in the executive limitations policies.

 

Crafting Policies as Nested Sets

 

So far this model has described the distinctions between Ends policy, Executive Limitations policy (both of which are then delegated to the CEO) and the Governance Process and Board-Staff Linkage policies (which are delegated to the Chair of the Board for the conduct of the Board).  Policy Governance provides for an additional principle, which is the distinctiveness of the policy provision through organisational values.  Organisational values in this instance there is the scope provided in the policy language.  It provides for breadth or narrowness, depending on what and how much the board is prepared to delegate.

 

This is best illustrated by the following examples.  A university board may have an Ends policy that reads “persons regardless of age, gender, race who show potential academic ability shall be provided a course of study of their choice.”  A board may feel that this Ends policy provides too much scope for the university to spread its courses of study too widely.  It therefore may choose to narrow the choice by adding another policy “As a priority courses of study shall be offered to those prepared to attend on-campus classes”.  Thus the broader ends policy is further defined by confining the offerings first to on-campus classes.  The governing board is thereby limiting the scope of the all encompassing ends policy, by giving priority to those wanting to study on-campus, and then only as a lesser priority to those wishing to study off-campus.  In this instance, the CEO is tied to the governing board’s ruling of priority, and although this ends policy could have been left at the higher (broad) policy level, the board has chosen to narrow or limit the power of the CEO as to how he/she may assign places in courses of study.  The level of specificity is for the board to decide until it is comfortable with the level of delegation left.  It may be in the example the board concludes that the second narrower policy is too restrictive, and it can be decided at some time to rescind the policy.  So nested sets are about the policy language moving from the broader to the narrower, methodically.  It is about the board’s organisational values.  It allows the board to manage the amount it wishes to delegate.  When properly articulated it is clear about the authority being given away.  The recipient of the delegation is clear about the amount of accountability expected in return.  Consequently, for each policy issue the board owns the broadest policy, then successively to smaller levels until it decides to delegate, after which the board considers it safe to allow remaining decisions to be made by others.

 

Critics of the analysis have stated that it is too artificial to have to distinguish between board work and management work.  There is no universal rule to mark the point where board policy stops and where administration begins.  Carver contends that this criticism is correct because traditional boards have not sought to consciously define their roles from management roles – hence the tension, confusion and the inability to hold anyone accountable or assess performance.

 

It is when boards use the Policy Governance principles correctly that one has a distinct point of delegation applicable to the stage of development of the organisation.  It is at that point of time, the values of that board, for that organisation that governance stops with delegation at the correct level, and management begins.  However, in any external presentation, the board speaks with one voice, as the accountable voice, even on the matter of a management decision because it was through this policy governance process, a delegated matter resulted in a management decision. 

 

In summary then, Policy Governance boards develop policies, which describe their values about ends, executive limitations, governance process and board-staff linkage.  Each policy is developed from the broadest, most inclusive level to more narrow defined levels until the board reaches a point it is comfortable leaving the interpretation of the policy and making decisions there on to its delegatee.  Ends and executive limitation policies are delegated to the CEO, who is held accountable by the board for reasonable interpretation of the policy.  Governance process and board-staff linkage policies are means policies for the board, who is given authority to ensure that the board governs in accordance with its own expectations of itself, using any reasonable interpretation of the policy language.

 

Board Discipline, Mechanics, and Structure

 

The greatest challenge to the traditional board arises from the approaches to board discipline, mechanics and structure that this Policy Governance principle require.

 

Given the principles encountered thus far, Policy Governance boards are required to do three things;

 

a)              as representatives of owners they must connect the organisation with the owners.  They connect the organisation with the owners in order to ascertain organisational values so that the ends decisions reflect the decisions on behalf of the owners in all their diversity of thought;

b)             as governance board it must spend its time in delivering written governing policies in the three categories identified in the paper; and

c)              as representatives of owners it must assure itself of organisational performance. That is that the ends and executive limitation policies have been met and delivered.

 

Carver calls these three things deliverables because they mean job products, outputs or values-added.  This is the purpose for the board’s job and producing these deliverables is what board meetings should be all about.  This job description for a board determines its agenda – an agenda that is perpetual, because there is nothing else for the board to do as a board other than these three deliverables.

 

Consequently traditional boards accustomed to agendas prepared by the CEO or staff; familiar with documents coming from management with a request for approval, will find the above approach radical, as in this approach it is the board that drives the agenda rather than staff driven.

 

Accordingly, the board must plan meetings to enable and guarantee the production of the three deliverables.

 

Boards are therefore required to exercise a number of disciplines as a result of this approach:

            

a)              they should not set up committees or make decisions on matters delegated to the CEO; to do so makes it impossible to hold the CEO accountable;

b)             there is no room in the agenda to talk about issues because they interest individual members or fall within the technical competence of individual members; to do so is not governance;

c)              whilst the board is entitled to any amount of information it wants, being entertained by staff jobs or staff plans is no substitute for doing the board’s job;

d)             the board as a board should not fall into the trap of giving advice, or be in the practice of establishing advisory committees.  That confuses the role of the board, from that of the CEO.  The CEO is free to call on any number of advisors from amongst board members, but this is not the same as a board sub-committee;

e)              the practice of having Treasurers or a Finance Committee of the board undermines the accountability to be placed on the CEO.  For a more thorough treatment of the board’s role in financial oversight, including a comment on the Treasurer and Finance Committee, see Carver (1991, 1996).  The board should confine itself to making an ends and executive limitation policy on financial matters. The place of audit committees as a committee of the board is perfectly legitimate, as it is to ensure that systems in place are working with the policies set by the board;

f)              the only other committees that a board needs to establish are those that enable it to do its own job, that is explore ownership views for ends options, seeking advice on executive limitations policy, seek independent evaluation of the organisational performance against ends policies etc.  Committees on human resources, capital works and finances undermine executive roles.

 

 

The next important job for the board is the appointment of the Chair.  By doing so the board takes responsibility for itself. Since the board, by delegation, is a group of equal peers, the Chair is the first among equals.  The Chair’s role is to see that the board Governance process policies and the board-staff linkage policies are adhered to.

 

Many traditional board members are chosen for their expertise in management in a variety of professions.  However, board members require expertise in governance, not only management.  Governance excellence requires a separate set of skills.  It is necessary to think conceptually, have a long-term vision, be able to welcome diversity and openness but abide by group decisions.  They must be able to speak on behalf of the ownership, rather than their own splinter interests.  They must place organisational accountability above personal gratification.  They must be able to view the board’s task from an arm’s length – through setting expectations and delegating clearly.  Above all they must also be able to monitor and evaluate what they have set out as expectations on behalf of the ownership.

 

Monitoring Performance and Evaluation

 

In the previous section it was suggested that the board meetings need to focus on three things

 

a)              finding out about what the ownership thinks and connecting the organisation through Ends policy (visioning)

b)             setting up and examining the three categories of policy governance policies and

c)              establishing whether the Ends policies are being achieved and adhered to within the context of Executive Limitations.

 

It is this last area that this section of the paper concentrates.  Many boards simply fail to spend sufficient time on evaluation.  If they do, they receive copious and complex reports on key performance indicators (KPIs) and measures, which require technical committees to unravel and understand them.  This is because these KPIs are connected with plans (human resources, assets management, information systems, research and development etc).  Such evaluations are interesting and useful, but by-and large they have no place within Policy Governance.

 

If Policy Governance is about setting organisational expectations through policies; if it is about setting clear delegations to its only employee, the CEO, then it stands to reason that the evaluation of performance of the CEO is all that is required by the board. It can therefore be an ongoing activity – with a section of every meeting set aside for it.  It is a process that commences with the particular Ends policy, with its Executive Limitations, and an assessment of whether the policy outcomes are being achieved.  (The board could have an annual evaluation of the CEO, as part of the determination for remuneration).

 

Governance researchers have commented on the vast amount of information and data provided to traditional boards.  Such information in evaluating plans has indeed been interesting, informative and assisted board members to understand the environmental context within which their organisation operates.  It assists board members in reviewing its visionary ends policy – but it is not the evaluation required for governance.

 

Evaluation based on data that focuses on whether the particular ends policy has been met is fair on the CEO – he/she knows in advance what is the basis of the evaluation.  Very often boards examine pages and pages of financial statements, prepared in accordance with international accounting and auditing standards, and have not concluded easily whether their financial ends policy has been met.  What boards require is an independent (auditor’s) report on the financial status of the organisation with key responses as to whether the executive limitations set under that ends policy have been met.  This then becomes a simple, less time-consuming exercise.

 

Policy Governance not only requires organisational evaluation of the CEO; it requires evaluation of itself as a board – and therefore of the governance process policies and the board-staff linkage policies. Carver claims this evaluation can be simple, rather that an annual exercise, it can occur at every meeting.

 

Board Meetings

 

Policy Governance is about a totally different approach to governance from traditional board governance.  One of the most visible changes are board meetings.  Because Policy Governance boards are in charge of their own job, board meetings become the board’s meeting rather than management’s meetings for the board.  Board meetings are not there for reviewing the past, being entertained by staff, helping staff do its work, giving advice or going through the ritual of approvals of things like human resources plans. .  Some board gatherings are opportunities for board members to learn together, to contemplate and deliberate together, and to decide together. These gatherings may look like seminar sessions, workshops or held jointly with other boards, particularly in communities where boards rarely talk to each other. However these sessions should not be confused with deliberative governing  meetings.

 

In Policy Governance the CEO is always present at board meetings but is not the central figure.  There is no reason why such boards, (in non-profit public organisations) are not open to the public.

 

Board meetings are about Ends not means; it is about long term futures rather than short-term exigencies; it is about major decisions, not small ones; it is about primary relationship with the owners, not with staff.

 

If CEOs were to be given maximum decision making authority permissible by the board in an accountable and delegated way, is it not possible for future ENRONs and World.Com scandals to occur? Has that not been the precise problem of corporate failures at the beginning of the new millennium?  Carver would argue that in a traditional board the answer to those questions is probably yes, because the nature of Ends policies is not clear, consistent, coherent.  Boards have spent too much time on being entertained by staff plans etc, rather than governing.  The Policy Governance principles, properly and rigorously introduced should avoid the pitfalls.

 

In higher education institutions there exists another board referred to as academic senates – a non-executive body – which, it is argued, is a partner in shared governance.  Before we examine such bodies, there is a need to review the claims made in the Carver Policy Governance model.

APPRAISAL OF THE CARVER POLICY GOVERNANCE MODEL

 

In the previous section the Carver Policy Governance model has been described in some detail for the following reasons:

 

●          the model is a registered service mark and any presentation of the Carver model therefore needs to be closely replicated from the literature provided;

●          the Carver model based on principles is very strict about the disciplines required.  The all or none approach claimed by the authors need to be respected if any appraisal is to take place.

 

Is the model as good as its authors claim it to be?  Is it a panacea to all board dilemmas?

 

There have been a number of claims and assertions on the model’s performance (Murray, 1999; Renz, 1999; Cornforth, 1999).  Despite the fact that it is nearly a decade since the model was first introduced, the first systematic study of the effectiveness of the model was reported in the ARNOVA (Nobbie & Brudney, 2002).  The authors tested the implementation, board performances and organisational effectiveness of the model as it applied in non-profit boards.  The authors set up three control groups: those that claimed and closely adhered to the Policy Governance model; those that were trained by the National (US) Center for Non-profit Boards; and a random sample of non-profit organisations.  Board members, chairpersons and CEOs of the organisation were surveyed.  The authors tested five hypotheses to establish whether the model was perceived to be more effective by those using it, compared with those not using it, or using a different model. It also tested whether the members felt there were improvements in board performance upon introducing the model. The test results show that the hypothesis was supported in 2 out of 5 cases when compared with the random sample of “other” board members - the results of some significance.  However, it was only partially supported in those two hypotheses when compared to NCNB “training” model, - with results not being significant.  The remaining 3 hypotheses were not supported by the evidence of the research.

 

Of significance there is evidence to suggest that the CEOs got greater satisfaction with their boards who used the model and that the chairs of the policy governance boards felt that the model provided greater clarity of roles and satisfaction.

 

There was no evidence to support that the revenue to expenditure ratios improved after using this model, or whether board members felt they had acquired new skills, or that internal processes had improved upon introduction of the model.

 

A random interview of non-profit agencies in Australia who use the model indicates the following anecdotal evidence:

●          95% who were trained on the model modified the model to suit their purposes;

●          There is the danger that important board time can be taken up arguing whether they were using the model strictly and its application rather than dealing with the issues. In other words there is danger that the tool could dominate discussion rather than aid it.

●          CEOs felt that the discipline of reporting key performance activities against ends was more onerous, than previously, and was not as productive. However, equally some board members felt they were discussing pertinent issues.

●          CEOs felt board members did not engage sufficiently in discussing the ends policy and that they (the CEOs) were still telling the boards what they should be setting as executive limitations.

·               All agreed that much more time was spent finding and refining what the owners want – that is more workshops, although strictly speaking these were not doing the job of governing.

●          CEOs, chairmen and board members all felt they had a clear understanding of the principles and this helped them to productively and effectively govern the organisation.

●          Some board members (who served under different systems) felt this model, for the first time assisted them in better appraisal of their own performance and also in establishing whether the organisational expectation were being met.

●          Some CEOs and chairs felt the communication between them improved through the introduction of this model and also felt more positively on the way they were treating governance.

 

The conclusion from this section is that, despite the claims of Carver, it is possible to adapt the model to the culture of the organisation.  That training in the model is useful as is training in other models of governance and preferable to no training at all.

 

With adjustment and adaptation, the monitoring and evaluation of organisational performance by boards is superior to those of other boards not using the model.

 

ACADEMIC SENATES – THEIR ROLE IN SHARED GOVERNANCE

 

The Carver Governance model presupposes that the ‘board’ is supreme in the governance structure. There are governance structures based on the bi-cameral model

Academic Senates, under various names are historically older than boards, as indeed are universities, which are older than business corporations.  They are bodies of staff and students who share in the governance of their organisations.  Their origins are in monasteries where the monks and friars wanted to have a say in the way their organisations were managed by the abbots – who governed under papal authority.  When the first university came into being at Bologna, the fellowship of staff and students (although it was not easy to distinguish between learners and teachers) constituted the body, which gave advice to the Rector on the way the place was run.  Papal edicts justified the existence of such bodies.  They usually had no written terms of reference in the modern sense but were able to comment on any matter of significance.  They had no powers as such as these resided with the Rector (the modern day Vice-Chancellor or President of the University).  However, conventional wisdom ensured that Rectors listened to their senates, and any disquiet was either ruthlessly put down, or, if the senate members were more influential (they were the sons of privileged barons, princes or dukes), the system of the Visitor would be invoked.  The Visitor, as the Pope’s representative, was called to inquire into any alleged impropriety.

 

To a limited degree the German and the Dutch models for business corporations provide for a management board and a supervisory board – the latter comprising representatives of staff and unions. However there is no equivalent body in the English speaking countries with the respective corporations law. 

 

Academic Senates have been fiercely independent even though they have not traditionally ever been accountable.  In newer universities, which at the outset were dependent on public funding, boards were established through respective acts of parliament, but in many cases the acts also provided for academic senates giving such boards crucial governance advice. At Cambridge and Oxford the legislative provisions make such Senates part of a bi-cameral system of governance.

 

Tension between academic senates and their boards have been known to occur. These have occurred when the board has the backed the CEO in matters which the Academic Senate have felt had been interference into their domain..

 

The sometimes cosy relations between boards and management, coupled with the recalcitrance of some academic senates, have resulted in academic senates being dismissed by some boards in newer universities (Fogg, 2001) or national inquiries to restrict their influence in university governance (Watzman, 2003).  On the other hand, were it not for the existence of independent academic senates, the cosy board-CEO relationship would not expose inefficiencies and bad management which could cost millions of dollars in wastage as was revealed by The Regents House – the equivalent of academic senate at Cambridge (Shattock, 2002). On the other hand the same body in Cambridge has such extensive powers over its governing board that it is even becoming difficult for the governing body to give more executive responsibility to its newly-appointed Vice-Chancellor (Macleod & Crace, 2002).  Nonetheless, it can be said that academic senates serve as a useful check and balance on board-management issues.  This is because staff know the inner workings of the organisation, that no conceivably externally appointed board can know.  The ethos of academic freedom, of criticism without fear of retribution, makes for more open government, and for the surfacing of issues.  The ENRON, World.Com, and Arthur Anderson scandals only came to light through whistle-blowers who subsequently were awarded the prestigious 2002 Persons of the Year award by Time magazine.  There is no organised way, as there is in universities, for there to be an open channel of communication between staff and clients, and their respective boards in business corporations.

 

Academic Senates have plodded along through the centuries, without responsibility and accountability, but with the privileged role of being critical.  Their sizes have varied from 3000 at Cambridge, to 40 in a number of institutions.  They have been critical of their own ineffectiveness, but never been quite able to address their own weaknesses in a deliberative way.  Under the guise of academic freedom they have existed much like people’s forums in some ancient middle-eastern (Arab) towns where the sultan goes down to the civic meeting place to listen to people’s grievances and dispense justice or override decisions made by his own bureaucracies. 

 

Even though academic senates have felt the need to have supremacy over academic decision-making, they have not volunteered to act proactively whenever academic misdemeanours occur.  Instead, the pressure has been on the Vice-Chancellors (or the CEOs) to clean up the academic mess.  On the other hand, when managements have taken disciplinary action on what would have appeared to be academic adventurism, academic senates have been strong to voice their concerns about due process and academic freedom (see the Orr case, in Davis, 1990).

 

Since the late 1970s in North America, and in the late 1980s and 1990s in the United Kingdom and Australia the nature of these bodies began to change.  The advent of quality assurance, and discussions on the efficiency and effectiveness of higher education has put more pressure on academic senates.  These bodies needed to ask themselves the simple quality assurance questions that all managements, and boards began to ask.  These were as follows:

 

·               Are you effective? How do you know?

·               Are you committed to quality?  What are your feedback loops?

·               How often do you review yourself?  What do you do with the review results?

 

As the boards of universities embraced the fourth stage of board evolution – that is on focussing on five or six key issues for boards, academic senates suddenly found themselves in the business of approving operational policies – matters which the Policy Governance model defines as the delegated matters to the CEO but which have been defined within the concepts of shared governance (UC, 1998)

 

Consequently, the academic senate role has clearly changed.  No longer can they see themselves as representative of vested groups, but trustees for the university when they made decisions.  However, how can they make decisions, when technically these are delegated to the CEO?  How can the governing board allow academic senates to make operational decisions and then hold the CEO accountable? Therefore, the relationship of academic senates and management needs considerable refining as does the relationship between academic senates and boards of universities who are both non-executive bodies.

 

Nonetheless, the change in the role of academic senates represents a partnership of one sort with the governing board, and another sort with management.  The change in role has necessitated academic senates to review their operations, to review their compositions, their rules for quorum etc.  The members have suddenly found themselves becoming serious partners in the organisation rather than mere armchair critics of the system.

 

The Review of the Management of Higher Education (Hoare, op cit) and the subsequent reviews have all reaffirmed the necessity of having strong independent academic senates. However, they also call for these bodies to take a greater accountable role in areas such as monitoring policy implementation (AUQA, 2002). Given the Carver model does not provide for a bi-cameral system of governance there is a need to specifically adjust the model to a university environment.

THE CASE FOR CURTIN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTING THE CARVER GOVERNANCE MODELâ

 

Curtin University of Technology governance history shows all the typical stages identified in the general trends of evolution of governing boards in universities (de Sousa, 1996).

 

Although the idea of an institute of technology emerged in the post-war days in the 1950s, the opportunity to realise it came with State government support in the second half of the sixties.  The State government, committed to the vision of an advanced technical education, took the opportunity offered to it by the Commonwealth government through the making of funds available to what was then a new sector of higher education.  Above all three prominent education bureaucrats were committed to realising the vision.  One of these became the founder CEO, and the others were appointed, amongst others, to the interim Council (or board).  This “kitchen-table” board was precisely the sort of board required to give it the skilled, social, political and governmental help required to ensure that resources of the magnitude of between $35 –67 million were poured into establishing an Institute of Technology in the first ten years. (White, 1996).

 

The story of the stages of board governance at Curtin is summarised in Table 1 below

TABLE 1

FIVE STAGES OF GOVERNANCE BOARD DEVELOPMENT – CURTIN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

 

NUMBER	1	2	3	4	5
PERIOD	1966-1969	1970-1973	1974-1995	1996-2003	2004?
STAGE NAME (de Sousa)	Greenfields (Evolutionary) (Kitchen-Table)	Management Reporting System (Evolutionary)	Committee-Driven System (Evolutionary)	Strategic Focus Governance (Reform Process)	Policy Governance   (Reform Process)
MODEL NAME (Parhizgar)	Prefectory	Prefectory	Supervisory	Superintendence	Superintendence
Characteristics	* No difference between governance & management * Board members act as management staff * Persons serving on board are passionate advocates	* CEO is delegated powers (Council, 1969) * CEO also asked to establish an academic board (Council, 1967) * Board requires regular reports on operations from CEO * Board “endorses” CEO reports * Still no distinction between roles of governance and management, despite delegation	* Board establishes committees to examine management proposals (Council, 1973) * Management proposals come from “internal” advisory committees of the CEO * Both Resources & Academic Boards are advisory to and chaired by the CEO * Layered/Tiered Committee system develops  * Board committees given power to approve some management proposals, others are recommended to Board * Board rubberstamps committee recommendations   * Board still requires CEO reports for endorsement.	* Layered committee system disbanded (Council, 1995) * Academic Senate formally reports to Council, no longer chaired by CEO and is not advisory to CEO (Council, 1992) * Large number of committees made advisory to Executive Managers * Board decides to focus on five-six strategic issues * Board introduces a Policy Reform structure to support the Strategic focus (Council, 2000) * CEO (and Academic Senate) given operational policy & decision making powers *CEO still required to prepare periodic reports which the Board endorses * Beginnings of distinction between “governance” and management	* Clarity as to why Boards exist * Boards create & control agendas * Boards spend time over Ends policies and Executive Limitations * Boards spend time over finding out “ownership” issues. * Boards spend time on evaluation * Boards are clear on delegation * Delegatees are clear on their roles/powers * Delegetees’ reports are interesting but not matters for board decision making * Boards capable of assessing performance of organisation

At Curtin, the introduction of a Policy framework which set out clearly governance policies and also a quality assured the format of presentation of policies provides a starting point for examination on whether further refinements are required to the fourth stage – into the fifth stage. Under this model Governance policies are established for: Strategic Positioning; Legislation, Common Law and Policy Compliance; Fiduciary Responsibility; Risk Management; and Appointment, performance and remuneration of the CEO and Senior Executives.   The Carver policy governance model gives clues on how the policies can be further refined.

 

Curtin can do this by examining

 

a)         Whether there is a need for an additional Governance Policy – the ends policy on Academic Senate.  Such a policy could clearly set out the Board’s expectation of the Academic Senate and ensure that it does not conflict with the delegation principles for the CEO;

b)         Whether there is not the need for a Financial ends policy – this appears to be a gross omission in the the board is not setting it expectations of the CEO with regard to financial management;

c)         All existing governance policies need a re-examination whether they are truly “ends” policies or Governance process policies.  They need re-examination as to whether there are sufficient executive limitations in them based on the Policy Governance principles; and

d)         Governance policies need to be re-examined to ensure that performance indicators are included as expectations of the board (as distinct to expectations of the CEO).

 

Once the above is achieved, board meeting practices may need to change.  Boards need to consciously plan their agendas with the CEO reporting against key indicators of the governance policies.

 

All the above areas involve a continuous process of adjustment and refinement in the light of experience, cultural and environmental changes.  This fulfils the notion of quality assurance through continuous improvement.

 

CONCLUSION AND CHALLENGES

 

This paper has traced the history of the evolution of governing boards generally and concluded that the Curtin University of Technology Board has shown all the characteristics of that evolution.  The paper has gone to some lengths to describe a fifth stage (Policy Governance stage) based on the Carver Policy Governanceâ model.  The purpose of the lengthy description of the model is to stimulate discussion for further reform of the Curtin board.

 

Can Curtin’s board give effect to the Policy Governance model?  Carver admits that the model implies a paradigm shift not only for the board members but also for management staff who have been in the habit of preparing the agendas for such boards. de Sousa (1997) concluded that boards require a trigger before they can be prepared to undertake change. The fourth stage reforms at Curtin were possible partly because of dissatisfaction of external board members with board proceedings that were then dominated by internal board members who used their local skills and knowledge to dominate discussions.  In this environment, external members felt somewhat disenfranchised.

 

What then are the triggers for further reform?  It is possible that the board’s inability to carry out an evaluation of its organisational objectives is of sufficient heightened concern to enable it to want to reform?  Or will the institution wait for other higher education institutions to introduce the Governance Policy model before it tries to follow suit?  These are some of the challenges in this paper.

 

References

 

AUQA (2002).  Report of an Audit of Curtin University of Technology.  October.  Canberra, ACT

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Carver, J & Oliver, C (2002) Corporate Boards That Create Value: Governing Company Performance from the Boardroom.  Jossey – Bass, San Francisco (see also International Policy Governance Association (IPGA)  @ policygovernanceassociation.com)

Carver, J (1997) Boards That Make a Difference.  Jossey-Bass, San Francisco

Carver, J (2001) Un nouveau paradigme de gouvernance: un nouvel ēquilibre entre le conseil d’administration el le chef de la direction.Governance: Revue Internationale, V2 (1) Printemps, Hiver Quebec.  (Published in English by Carver, J & Carver, M (2001) Carver’s Policy Governanceâ Model in non Profit Organisations, @carvergovernance.com)

Chait, R.P, Holland, T.P. & Taylor, B.E. (1996) Improving the performance of Governing Boards.  America Council on Education (ACE) & The Oryx Press, Phoenix, Arizona.

Cornforth, C (1999)  Improving the Value of Voluntary Boards.  Journal of Voluntary Action, Vol I (2)

Council (Curtin) (1995) Structure and Operations of Council and its Committees (the Trevor Gorey Report).  Minutes of Council, December (unpublished)

Council (Interim WAIT) (1967) Academic Subcommittee.  Minutes of the Interim Council, 19 June, (unpublished)

Council (WAIT) (1969) Statute No 6 – Powers of the Director.  Minutes of the WAIT Interim Council, WA Gazette, 11 June.

Council (WAIT) (1974) Committees of Council and Terms of Reference.  Minutes of the WAIT Council, xxxx (unpublished)

CTEC (1986) Review of Efficiency and Effectiveness in Higher Education. AGPS, Canberra.

CUC (2000) Review of University Governance. HEFCE, HMSO, UK

Davis, R (1990) Open to Talent: The Centenary History of the University of Tasmania, 1890-1990, Sandy Bay, Tas, Australia

Dawkins, J.S. (1988) Higher Education: a policy statement.  Circulated by Minister for Employment, Education and Training, AGPS, Canberra.

de Sousa, A.O. (1997) University Governance: An Australian Experience.  Proceedings of the International Association of Management, Vol 15, Number 1.  Maximillan Press

de Sousa, A.O. (1998) Reform in University Policy Making: An Australian Case Study.  Proceedings of the International Association of Management, Vol 16,  Number 1.  Maximillan Press

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